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Background: Non-conscious neural activation may underlie various psychological functions in health and disorder.
However, the neural substrates of non-conscious processing have not been entirely elucidated. Examining the differential
effects of arousing stimuli that are consciously, versus unconsciously perceived will improve our knowledge of neural
circuitry involved in non-conscious perception. Here we conduct preliminary analyses of neural activation in
studies that have used both subliminal and supraliminal presentation of the same stimulus.
Methods: We use Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) to examine functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) studies that uniquely present the same stimuli subliminally and supraliminally to healthy participants
during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We included a total of 193 foci from 9 studies
representing subliminal stimulation and 315 foci from 10 studies representing supraliminal stimulation.
Results: The anterior cingulate cortex is significantly activated during both subliminal and supraliminal stimulus
presentation. Subliminal stimuli are linked to significantly increased activation in the right fusiform gyrus and
right insula. Supraliminal stimuli show significantly increased activation in the left rostral anterior cingulate.
Conclusions: Non-conscious processing of arousing stimuli may involve primary visual areas and may also
recruit the insula, a brain area involved in eventual interoceptive awareness. The anterior cingulate is perhaps a
key brain region for the integration of conscious and non-conscious processing. These preliminary data provide
candidate brain regions for further study in to the neural correlates of conscious experience.
Keywords: Subliminal, Supraliminal, Activation Likelihood Estimation, ANterior cingulate cortex, Fusiform gyrus,
Cingulate cortex, InsulaBackground
Recent brain imaging evidence suggests that subliminal
stimuli can alter behavior, via non-conscious processes
(Muscarella et al. 2013; Eimer & Schlaghecken 2003).
Neural models of behavior elicited by non-conscious
stimuli implicate the prefrontal and cingulate cortices in
the regulation of subcortical brain regions linked to im-
pulsive and largely non-conscious stimulus perception
(Ochsner et al. 2012). In this way therefore, one might* Correspondence: drsamanthabrooks@gmail.com
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article, unless otherwise stated.suggest that conscious cognitive processes, such as
decision-making and working memory that are asso-
ciated with prefrontal cortex networks, are influenced
by non-conscious experiences. William James and Carl
Lange, who were the first to provide theories for non-
conscious processes in the decision making capabilities of
the human mind, postulated the importance of physio-
logical mechanisms that are not at first consciously
perceived, e.g. that physiological changes in the body
following an event lead to a response that drives one’s
conscious decision-making processes (Cannon, 1927).
Some of James and Lang’s views are in line with con-
temporary notions of the unconscious mind, and somentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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roimaging studies (19, 21, 52).
Processing of non-conscious physiological responses in
the body by the cortex is a view that has been incorpo-
rated into many contemporary theories. One example by
Damasio (54) and Tranel (55) proposes that emotions,
which help us to make decisions, are cognitive stories
constructed by the cortex in a particular context to
explain bodily arousal; a view reflected in their re-
cently updated Somatic Marker Hypothesis, highlighting
the importance of brainstem (e.g. the periaquaductal
gray) activation in conscious experience (Damasio 2010;
Panksepp 2011). Perception of heart rate variability, a
largely automatic physiological process, can also influ-
ence the modulation of cognitions and emotions (Kim
et al. 2013). Others suggest overlapping but different
neural circuitry in consciousness, incorporating brain
processing in both non-conscious subcortical and con-
scious prefrontal regions respectively (Ochsner et al.
2012). Against this background, non-consciously perceived
stimuli we hypothesise, should therefore activate different
brain regions to stimuli that are consciously perceived.
A recent qualitative review of subliminal findings in
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) research
reports that non-consciously perceived stimuli can influ-
ence perceptual, lexical and semantic processing, but
that the neural response to subliminal stimuli depends
on the strength of stimulus presentation, as well as in-
dividual differences in threshold for conscious percep-
tion (Kouider & Dehaene 2007). Furthermore, this review
distinguishes between subliminal and preconscious aware-
ness, which may be reflected in varying degrees of cortical
versus subcortical recruitment, although the various para-
digms used to measure this limit the conclusions. Another
recent review revealed that the non-conscious processing
of motor responses involves the precuneus and supple-
mentary motor areas, whereas subjective experience of
voluntary action may involve fronto-parietal network acti-
vation (D'Ostilio & Garraux 2012). A recent review of
electrophysiological evidence of brain function shows that
error detection, a psychological function often associated
with the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) occurs non-
consciously (Shalgi & Deouell 2013). Thus, there is now
ample neurobiological evidence to suggest that conscious
and unconscious processing may have some overlap, but
that the origins may occur independently and in specific
brain areas. However, there has been no meta-analysis of
fMRI studies that measure different degrees of conscious
perception using the same stimulus.
Subliminal neuroimaging paradigms using masked and
thus non-consciously perceived stimuli provide a poten-
tial method to progress knowledge of the neural corre-
lates of non-conscious, primary processes in the brain.
For example, a recent meta-analysis of functional fMRIstudies has shown that subliminal arousing (versus sublim-
inal neutral) stimuli evoke distinct activations in primary
visual areas, somatosensory regions, implicit memory and
conflict monitoring systems independent of conscious
awareness of the stimulus (Brooks et al. 2012). This
large meta-analysis demonstrated a distinct lack of pre-
frontal cortex activation in response to non-consciously
perceived stimuli. However, this review did not explicitly
analyze differential neural activation to the same con-
scious, versus - unconsciously perceived arousing stimuli,
which would go some way to delineate which regions are
involved in conscious processing. While there is variability
in fMRI methods, in terms of the contrasts applied, partic-
ipants studied, stimulus presentation employed, coordin-
ate systems adopted (e.g. MNI, Talairach, AFNI), statistical
analyses used, a basic meta-analysis of fMRI data can yield
useful data with Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE)
(Laird et al. 2005; Eickhoff et al. 2009; Eickhoff et al. 2010;
Turkeltaub et al. 2011). ALE is a method that is currently
being used extensively in the neuroimaging field. However,
no meta-analysis has yet examined differential neural
activation in fMRI studies measuring conscious (supra-
liminal) versus unconscious (subliminal) perception of
the same stimulus. By doing so, we might provide a
preliminary delineation of activated brain regions asso-
ciated with conscious versus non-conscious percep-
tion, to guide further studies in the field.
Here, we are the first to conduct an exploratory ana-
lysis of brain regions in healthy subjects that are acti-
vated to subliminal and supraliminal stimuli. We use the
ALE approach to meta-analyse fMRI studies reporting
neural activation in response to both the subliminal and
supraliminal presentation of the same stimulus. Specific-
ally, we meta-analyse only those fMRI study publications
that used the same stimuli (but at different perception
thresholds) with the same participants and the same ex-
perimental conditions within the same publication. In all
studies included, subliminal perception was confirmed
by a forced choice task. This meta-analysis differs from
our recently published meta-analysis where only fMRI
studies using subliminal stimuli (arousing versus neutral)
were included with no activation to supraliminal percep-
tion (Brooks et al. 2012).
By contrast, this meta-analysis attempts to answer a
different question: how does conscious cognitive modu-
lation of a stimulus, relative to the same stimulus being
perceived unconsciously, alter brain activation? By illus-
trating here the core clusters of neural activation across
studies that contrast the level of subjective awareness of
a stimulus, we aim to delineate the regions associated
with conscious experience from regional activation associ-
ated with stimulus perception that is not at first consciously
experienced. In line with contemporary theories and our
recent meta-analyses, we hypothesise that consciously
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cingulate cortex regions linked to conscious cognitive
evaluation, whereas the same unconsciously perceived
stimuli will provoke relatively greater activation in sub-
cortical brain regions linked to implicit memory and
arousal, such as the hippocampus, amygdala, striatum
and primary visual cortex.
Methods
Searching
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
PubMed, Medline, Ovid, Sciencedirect, Web of Science
and Google Scholar were searched, and hand searches of
reference lists up to October 2013. Search terms for on-
line searches included fMRI and MRI, with subliminal
and supraliminal stimulation as our search criteria. To
be included in our meta-analysis, studies met the follow-
ing criteria: a) studies were published within the last
decade, between January 2001 to October 2013, b) pub-
lished in a peer-reviewed journal, c) used a task that uti-
lized both the subliminal and supraliminal presentation
of the same arousing stimulus, c) the study included a
direct contrast between brain activation to subliminal
and supraliminal stimulus presentation, d) were original
articles written in English, e) used functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and not other brain imaging
modalities (e.g. Positron Emission Tomography, [PET],
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation [TMS]) so that the
data could be better aggregated for meta-analysis, and f )
reported the neural activation coordinates in Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) or Talairach space (Talairach
& Tournoux 1988). Studies examining people with physio-
logical conditions who were without a psychiatric comor-
bid diagnosis were included (Irritable Bowel Syndrome,
IBS, Gastro-esophageal reflux disease, GERD). We ex-
cluded otherwise eligible fMRI studies that only used
Region of Interest (ROI) analysis as there is robust evi-
dence that these studies artificially inflate ALE analyses
(Eickhoff et al. 2009). Study selection was done by three
researchers (PM, SJB and HBS) and cross-checked be-
tween them. For a list of excluded studies, see Additional
file 1: Table S1. For details of our meta-analysis MOOSE
checklist inclusions, see Additional file 2: Table S2.
Selected studies
We found 77 studies that were initially screened for in-
clusion in the systematic review, but 20 of these did
not meet the eligibility criteria described above. Of
these 57 eligible studies, 13 were not included in the
meta-analyses because they did not provide details of
Talairach or MNI peak activation coordinates, and we
were not able to contact the authors. Of the 44 fMRI
studies to date, only 16 of these explicitly analyzed
contrasts between subliminal and supraliminal thresholdsof the same arousing stimulus or analyzed subliminal/su-
praliminal stimulation with a methodology similar to the
one used in studies implying direct comparison between
two different kinds of stimulation (the other studies
compared only subliminal neutral vs. subliminal arous-
ing stimuli). Of the 16 remaining studies with subliminal
vs. supraliminal studies with some overlap in studies pre-
senting both subliminal and supraliminal stimuli, 6 of
these were excluded because they used exclusively Region
of Interest (ROI) analysis, a technique that analyzes only a
small region of the brain, based on a priori hypotheses.
This is in contrast to a Whole Brain (WB) analysis, which
statistically analyzes activation across the whole brain in
one analysis. Thus, this left 10 WB fMRI studies that spe-
cifically included brain imaging coordinates for both sub-
liminal and supraliminal perception, uniquely, of the same
affective stimulus. It must be noted that one of the 10
studies directly compared subliminal with supraliminal
presentation of the same stimulus, but only reported dif-
ferential activation in the supraliminal condition, resulting
in 9 studies contributing to the subliminal condition, and
10 studies contributing to the supraliminal condition. We
included studies that either provided a direct comparison
between subliminal versus supraliminal stimulation, or
compared against a neutral condition (thus biasing the ac-
tivation reported towards either subliminal or supraliminal
perception). See Table 1 for a list of included studies.
Definition of subliminal and supraliminal stimuli
FMRI studies included in this meta-analysis contrast neural
activation to subliminal and supraliminal presentation of
the same stimuli (see Table 1 for details of the contrast for
each study). Contemporary definitions of subliminal stimu-
lation purport that stimuli are rendered subliminal if the
stimuli are not perceived consciously by the participant
(20,31,32). Subliminal stimulation is, in comparison to
consciously-perceived stimulation, relatively weak and
of low-intensity, suggesting that the neural processes
driving unconsciously-perceived stimuli are less sophisti-
cated and at the lower-order of function (Bargh & Morsella
2008). The effects of subliminal stimuli can now be mea-
sured in brain imaging studies, examining the brain pro-
cesses involved. Subliminal stimulation is not accessible to
conscious introspection, which means that the presenta-
tion of such stimuli cannot be consciously recollected
(Shalgi & Deouell 2013). Subliminal presentation is most
often achieved by a brief stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA)
usually not more than 50 ms, followed by a ‘masking’ pro-
cedure. Backward masking is the most common, where
another stimulus is presented directly after the subliminal
stimulus, preventing conscious perception (Breitmeyer
et al. 2007). In the present search, all studies included
in the review presented the same stimulus both at a
subliminal and a supraliminal level (see Table 1).
Table 1 List of studies included in the ALE meta-analyses




a) Subliminal activation greater than supraliminal activation
Diekhof et al. 2009 Healthy: 4 male, 5 female, 24.4 years (S.D. 2.2) Subtle changes in audio
frequency
Detectable changes in audio
frequency
9 1 WBe p < 0.001
Lawal et al. 2006 Irritable Bowel Syndrome: 10 female, Healthy:
10 female. 19–38 years
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated
below perception threshold)
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated above
perception threshold)
18 17 WBb p < 0.05
Phillips et al. 2004 Healthy: 5 males (grp.1), 29.5 years (S.D. 4.7)
5 male (grp. 2) 28.4 years (S.D. 6.2)
Covert angry and disgusted
faces
Overt angry and disgusted faces 8 23 WBb p < 0.005
Prochnow et al. 2013 Healthy: 5 men, 7 women, 23.8 years (S.D. 3.0) Covert facial expressions of
happiness, anger, sadness
Overt facial expressions of happiness,
anger, sadness
12 11 WBe p < 0.05 (2 foci
at p < 0.01)
Sidhu et al. 2004 Irritable Bowel Syndrome: 8 female, Healthy: 8
female, 19–38 years
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated
below perception)
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated at
perception and above perception)
16 64 WBb p < 0.05
Only subliminal stimulation
Duan et al. 2010 Healthy: 5 males, 13 females, 23.6 years (S.D. 1.3) Covert surprised faces 18 41 WBb p < 0.001
Kouider et al. 2009 Healthy: 8 males, 8 female, 23 years (S.D. 2) Covert famous faces 16 9 WBe p < 0.001
Smith et al. 2011 Healthy female, 29 years (range 19–53) Rectal stimulation (bag inflated
below perception)
14 13 WBb p < 0.001
Song et al. 2006 Irritable Bowel Syndrome: 12 female, Healthy:
12 female. 23 years (S.D. 0.3/S.D. 0.92)
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated
below perception)
24 13 WBb p < 0.001
135 192
b) Supraliminal activation greater than subliminal activation
Diekhof et al. 2009 Healthy: 4 male, 5 female, 24.4 years (S.D. 2.2) Subtle changes in audio
frequency
Changes in audio frequency 9 27 WBe p < 0.001
Gillath & Canterberry, 2011 Healthy: 19 male. 20 female, 19.65 years
(no avail S.D.)
Masked sexual images presented
at 23 ms
Supraliminal masked sexual images
presented at 524 ms
39 21 WBe p < 0.001
Lawal et al. 2006 Irritable Bowel Syndrome: 10 female, Healthy:
10 female. 19–38 years
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated
below perception threshold)
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated above
perception threshold)
18 25 WBb p < 0.05
Phillips et al. 2004 Healthy: 5 male (grp.1), 29.5 years (S.D. 4.7)
5 male (grp. 2) 28.4 years (S.D. 6.2)
Covert angry and disgusted
faces
Overt angry and disgusted faces 8 32 WBb p < 0.005
Prochnow et al. 2013 Healthy: 5 men, 7 women, 23.8 years (S.D. 3.0) Covert facial expressions of
happiness, anger, sadness
Overt facial expressions of happiness,
anger, sadness
12 11 WBe p < 0.05 (2 foci
at p < 0.01)
Sidhu et al. 2004 Irritable Bowel Syndrome: 8 female, Healthy:
8 female, 19–38 years
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated
below perception)
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated at
perception and above perception)
16 136 WBb p < 0.05
Only supraliminal stimulation
Hall et al. 2010 Irritable Bowel Syndrome: 7 female, Healthy:
6 female, 30–40 years
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated above
pain perception)
13 26 WBe p < 0.001


















Table 1 List of studies included in the ALE meta-analyses (Continued)
Smith et al. 2011 Healthy female, 29 years (range 19–53) Rectal stimulation (bag inflated above
pain perception)
14 9 WBb p < 0.001
Song et al. 2006 Irritable Bowel Syndrome: 12 female, Healthy:
12 female. 23 years (S.D. 0.3/S.D. 0.92)
Rectal stimulation (bag inflated above
pain perception)
24 20 WBb p < 0.001
169 315
Grand Total: 304 507
bBlock design fMRI, eEvent-related fMRI, n = number of participants, foci = number of separate Talairach coordinates contributing to the meta-analysis, n = number of participants, WB = Whole Brain Analysis,


















Figure 1 Topographical representation of the brain regions
illustrated by the meta-analysis. ACC: Anterior Cingulate Cortex;
r: rostral; c: caudate; FG: fusiform gyrus. To illustrate a topographical
representation of our results we used the Colin27_T1_seg_MNI template
provided on the GingerALE website (http://www.brainmap.org).
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To examine relative activation to the subliminal and su-
praliminal presentation of arousing stimuli, we conducted
two separate meta-analyses using BrainMap GingerALE
version 2.3.1 software (Laird et al. 2005). The ALE method
is a voxel-wise technique which provides information
from convergence in the spatial location of neural cor-
relates across studies. Neural correlates, or foci from
included studies become “activation likelihoods” for
each voxel in the brain and, for each one ALE gives a
score using a three-dimensional Gaussian probability
density function doing an estimation considering also
the number of subjects in each study. The Gaussian
distributions are then summed across studies to gener-
ate a map that estimate the likelihood of activation for
each voxel (Laird et al. 2011; Turkeltaub et al. 2012).
We applied the updated version of the ALE approach
(Eickhoff et al. 2010) to conduct the meta-analyses using
Talairach coordinates (“foci”) from neuroimaging results
and converting Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
coordinates in to Talairach for the analysis using Gin-
gerALE software. As suggested by Eickhoff et al. in their
technical note (28) we used a threshold of p < 0.05 with
cluster-level corrected inference using p < 0.001 uncor-
rected at voxel-level as the cluster-forming threshold. This
was to ensure that only highly significant clusters were re-
ported. We used an anatomical image overlay program
called Mango (Creators, Jack Lancaster, Michael Martinez:
http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango) to illustrate the results of
our meta-analyses, using the Colin27_T1_seg_MNI tem-
plate provided on the GingerALE website (http://www.
brainmap.org). We also used the Colin27_T1_seg_MNI
template to produce the schematic summary of our find-
ings in Figure 1.Results
Meta-analysis one: subliminal stimulation > supraliminal
stimulation
From 192 foci, 154 subjects and 9 separate experiments,
3 significant clusters were found that survived the clus-
ter level inference threshold. Cluster one was found in
right fusiform gyrus/middle occipital gyrus (x = 47, y = −71,
z = −3) in BA 19, cluster two was found in right caudal
anterior cingulate cortex (x = 2, y = 32, z = 36) in BA 32
and cluster three was found in right insula (x = 37, y = 4,
z = −5) in BA 13.Meta-analysis two: supraliminal stimulation > subliminal
stimulation
From 320 foci, 188 subjects and 10 separate experiments,
2 significant clusters were found that survived the cluster
level inference threshold. Cluster one was found in left an-
terior cingulate cortex (x = −2, y = 34, z = 18) in BA 32,cluster two was found in mid-caudal anterior cingulate
cortex (x = 0, y = 19, z = 31) in BA 32.
See Table 2 and Figures 2, 3 and 4.
For a schematic illustration of where these regions are
in the brain, and possible connections, see Figure 1.
Discussion
We present preliminary meta-analyses of fMRI studies
that compare the effects of subliminal versus supralimi-
nal presentation of the same stimulus on brain activa-
tion. When interpreting these findings, the categories
and differences between visual and tactile stimulation
must be considered with caution, as they may influence
the data observed. Specifically, left anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) was most significantly activated across all
studies when supraliminal processing was the reported
activation; the right fusiform gyrus/middle occipital gyrus
and right insula when subliminal processing was reported,
and the caudal anterior cingulate cortex to both levels of
perception. Additionally, it appears that subliminal stimu-
lation most often activates regions of the right hemi-
sphere, whereas in contrast, supraliminal stimulation
appears to activate the left hemisphere. This is intri-
guing given that the right hemisphere is typically associated
with emotional processing, whereas the left hemisphere is
linked to language processing and higher level emotional
processing that is largely consciously perceived (Bauer et al.
2014; Shobe 2014). This could suggest that conscious
processing is linked to left hemisphere, language-based
Table 2 Results of the ALE analyses, with significantly activated brain regions
Clustera Anatomical Label Side Brodmann area Peak voxel coordinatesb Cluster size (mm3) ALE value (×10−2)
x y z
Subliminal > Supraliminal 1008
1 Fusiform Gyrus Right 19 47 −71 −3 1008 4.12
2 Caudal Anterior Cingulate Cortex Right 32 2 18 36 920 2.52
3 Insula Right 13 37 4 −5 344 2.30
Supraliminal > Subliminal 4168
1 Anterior Cingulate Cortex Left 32 −2 34 18 1464 6.20
2 Caudal Anterior Cingulate Cortex Left 32 0 19 31 640 4.59
aALE clusters threshold at p < 0.05 (cluster-level uncorrected p, corrected for multiple comparisons, cluster-forming threshold at voxel level p <0.001).
bVoxel coordinates are in Talairach space.
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hemisphere maybe more associated with non-conscious
processing of one’s ‘gut-feelings’ and instincts. However,
the different stimuli included in these meta-analyses may
have influenced the results, and were: auditory tones
(although these were under-represented in the final meta-
analysis); rectal stimulation; famous, angry and disgusted
faces and sexual images. Nevertheless, all of these types ofz=27
y=-59 x=1
Figure 2 Right fusiform gyrus (subliminal). ALE significant
activation to subliminal > supraliminal arousing stimuli in Brodmann
Area 19, with a cluster size of 1008 voxels mm2, ALE value = 4.12.stimuli have in common that they stimulate sensations in
the peripheral nervous system.
Our hypotheses, that consciously perceived stimuli acti-
vate prefrontal cortex regions, in comparison to unconscious
perception of the same stimuli, were partially supported, in
that the ACC can be regarded as part of the prefrontal cor-
tex system. However, we did not, as expected, find subcor-
tical regions (e.g. amygdala, hippocampus, striatum) beingx=37y=6
Figure 3 Right insula (subliminal). ALE significant activation to
subliminal > supraliminal arousing stimuli in Brodmann Area 13, with
a cluster size of 344 voxels mm2, ALE value = 2.30.
x=-1y=29
z=22
Figure 4 Caudal anterior cingulate cortex (both subliminal and
supraliminal). Red cluster: subliminal > supraliminal analysis (x = 2,
y = 32, z = 36), cluster size of 920 voxels mm2, ALE value = 2.52.
Green cluster: supraliminal > subliminal analysis (x = 0, y = 19, z = 31),
cluster size of 640 voxels mm2, ALE value = 4.59. Yellow cluster: area of
overlapping. ALE significant activation to both subliminal and
supraliminal arousing stimuli in Brodmann Area 32.
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found that the right fusiform gyrus and right insula cortices
were most significantly activated by subliminal stimuli.
However, again it must be considered that these observa-
tions could be due to the type of stimuli used (e.g. faces
and rectal stimulation), rather than as a consequence of
variance in conscious perception. Most other fMRI studies
using subliminal paradigms compare subliminal arousing
to subliminal neutral stimuli, but the studies included in
this review only compared supraliminal and subliminal
presentation of the same stimulus within the same study
(Brooks et al. 2012). The preliminary findings we present
here for the first time compare neural activation to con-
scious and unconscious processing of the same stimulus,
either in a direct comparison of subliminal versus supra-
liminal stimulation, or including subliminal versus - and
supraliminal versus neutral contrasts using the same stimu-
lus within the same study. Our meta-analysis lends support
to some current theories about the neural correlates ofconsciousness, and also has the potential to progress our
understanding of psychological processes, by providing a
priori brain regions involved in the delineation of automatic
non-conscious states from conscious experience. Next, we
discuss these findings in relation to the different levels of
perceptual awareness, and theories of consciousness.
Unconscious perception of stimuli
The right fusiform gyrus, part of the middle occipital
gyrus, was most consistently activated across the fMRI
studies included in this review, in response to sublimin-
ally presented arousing stimuli that were not consciously
perceived. This result could be driven by more studies
that employed the presentation of faces in this meta-
analysis, although it is nonetheless interesting to observe
that non-consciously processed faces activate this region.
While the fusiform gyrus is most well-known as the
‘fusiform face area’, particularly during conscious per-
ception of faces, activation in this area may also be associ-
ated with non-verbal facial communication (Kreifelts et al.
2013), which is perhaps more implicit on first glance.
Furthermore, the middle occipital gyrus is associated
with the decoding of affectively arousing stimuli (Dima
et al. 2011). It is connected with the amygdala, a brain
region associated with unconscious processing (Slipp
2000) and also general arousal (Costafreda et al. 2008)
and may be associated with the processing of bottom
up stimuli to influence declarative memory.
Another area we found to be significantly activated by
subliminal stimulation is the right posterior insula cortex
(PIC), which is in agreement with our previous meta-
analysis of fMRI studies (Brooks et al. 2012). The insular
cortex is traditionally linked to conscious interoceptive
awareness and the perception of one’s own body (Craig
2010; Craig 2009). However, given the insula’s connectiv-
ity to subcortical and cortical regions, this brain region
could also adhere to the role of “director” of somato-
sensory responses from the internal mileu, which may
pre-empt conscious decisions or awareness. Therefore, it
is plausible that the insular cortex would be activated in
response to subliminal stimuli in order to modulate a
consequential conscious response to a change in somato-
sensory or visceral stimulation. The data we present here
suggests that a perception of perturbations in the body
can occur without conscious awareness, and might be
encoded as activation at the level of the primary occipital
cortex (perhaps via connections to the amygdala) and the
insular cortex.
Anterior cingulate cortex: a gateway between pre-attentive
bottom-up and top-down cognitive evaluation?
Activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was
observed across studies in response to both subliminal
and supraliminal arousing stimuli in this review. This
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following a false mental prediction and in the detection
of internal conflict, such as dissonance between two
competing goals, but it is unclear whether this is associ-
ated with conscious perception of the stimulation or not
(Charles et al. 2013). Some evidence suggests that the
greater the conscious processing exerted, the higher the
activation that is observed in the ACC (Mulert et al.
2005). Additionally, the insular cortex and ACC have
strong connections that elaborate on emotional feelings
and play a role in sensory perception and conscious
evaluation (Critchley 2005). The IC-ACC network has
also been linked to conscious self-recognition (Devue
et al. 2007) and is implicated in conscious executive pro-
cesses (De Pisapia et al. 2011). Prediction error detection
is largely associated with activation of the ACC and this
is also in line with contemporary views of emotion and
the experience of presence, purporting that an emotional
sense of self is not simply derived from sensing intero-
ceptive signals, but also determined by prediction error
processing, or how our belief systems match reality (Seth
et al. 2011). This lends support to the view that the ACC
functions as a gateway between automatic primary
process affective states and higher order cognitive pro-
cessing, particularly when affect and cognition are in con-
flict, or in psychiatric conditions such as post-traumatic
stress disorder (Botvinick et al. 1999; Cohen et al. 2013). A
conflict may also occur in the absence of awareness, when
the body’s physiology is unexpected perturbed, as shown
for example in this meta-analysis, where some of the in-
cluded studies used stimuli that altered the physiological
state of the body without conscious awareness. However,
the different types of stimulation included in this review
may have confounded our findings, and so caution must
be taken with interpretation. Furthermore, despite the ori-
ginal stimulus being unconsciously perceived, subsequent
bodily reflexes, such as heart rate variability, tactile stimu-
lation, perspiration, muscle tension are likely to be con-
sciously perceived (e.g. the basis of a gut feeling). In a
recent study, the presentation of subliminal sexual images
was linked to ACC activation and potential cognitive con-
flict in men, as sexual affective states were engaged in the
brain, but not indulged, which likely led to a conscious
perception of frustration (Gillath & Canterberry 2011).
Furthermore, others show that there is a dynamic relation-
ship between bottom-up primary sensory activations and
top-down modulation by the ACC (Crottaz-Herbette &
Menon 2006), formulating an eventual global, or ‘bigger
picture’ perspective. It is likely that affect processing,
whether at first consciously perceived or not, alters pre-
frontal cortical systems via the ACC. Translating this in
relation to the stimuli used in the fMRI studies presented
here, one might argue that stimulation of the rectum and
emotional faces (the most commonly used stimuli in thestudies included in this review) all evoke arousal states
deep in the brain that perturb pre-attentive neural circuits.
The level of ACC involvement in this process, subsequent
interoceptive awareness and cognitive evaluation of bodily
state in response to an affective stimulus, is likely to be
biased by previous experience in line with current self-
referential goals and contextual cues.
Linking our findings to theories of consciousness
Our data were not able to provide direct support for
Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis, which implicates
the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex and periaqueductal
gray in the influence of non-conscious processes on con-
scious decision making (Damasio 2010; Damasio 1994).
However, the studies presented here did not measure
decision making processes. Some contemporary theor-
ies of consciousness purport that the experience of
'qualia' or the subjective awareness of one's self per-
ceiving (e.g. what is it like to experience the colour
red?), is achieved by attention mechanisms in prefrontal
cortical systems, such as the ACC, being directed from
'backstage' signals that are represented by distinct neural
signatures in the mesolimbic brain regions, such as the
striatum (Baars & Franklin 2003) and primary visual areas
for mental imagery. Baars, in his Global Workspace
Theory (GWT) proposes the view that unconscious pro-
cesses, such as those derived from subliminal visual stim-
uli, interact with cognitive processes in the PFC, such as
working memory, to cognitively frame a consciously-
perceived self-relevant goal (Baars & Franklin 2003),
which may also be referred to as a ‘cognitive bias’.
Others support Baars’ global workspace theory, impli-
cating the ACC and areas that connect to this region
(e.g. insula cortex, visual cortex, mesolimbic regions),
enabling consciousness to be directed by a vast net-
work of backstage processes supporting neural func-
tions that are not consciously perceived, (Dehaene
et al. 2006) . Thus, although our meta-analysis highlights
brain regions involved in non-conscious sensory (as
opposed to cognitive) processing, it could be that acti-
vation of the ACC, visual cortex and insula by non-
consciously perceived stimuli could further influence
downstream prefrontal cortex systems (via the ACC as
a gateway to other PFC systems) associated with higher-
order cognitions (e.g. working memory).
Other contemporary theories of consciousness focus
on how non-conscious processing can influence behavior
and prime responses to stimuli (Eimer & Schlaghecken
2003). It has been shown that masked, and thus non-
consciously perceived stimuli can alter preferences and
speed of choice, which may for example, be the basis of
impulsive responses. Response facilitation and inhibition
in subliminal priming is suggested to involve fronto-
striatal circuits (Eimer & Schlaghecken 2003) and could
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http://www.biomedcentral.com//2/1/52be a key to understanding triggers for impulsive be-
haviours in some psychiatric disorders (e.g. addiction,
aggression, eating disorders).
However, our data did not implicate fronto-striatal cir-
cuitry (only ACC) in unconscious processing, but instead
found that non-consciously processed stimuli activate vis-
ual cortex, insula and ACC. Against the background of
the current data, must proceed with caution when choos-
ing subliminal paradigms to test theories of unconscious
perception, given our current lack of knowledge regarding
the underlying mechanisms of subliminal stimulation. For
example, it is not currently known to what extent the
semantic context of masked stimuli is processed at an
unconscious level, and whether subliminal stimulation
activates processes that linger in the brain for secondary
higher-order conscious processing. Given these limitations
to our current knowledge, subliminal paradigms may not
be the best choice for collecting data on unconscious pro-
cesses. Nevertheless, subliminal paradigms may be valu-
able for probing arousal mechanisms in the brain that are
independent of cognitive modulation (Brooks & Stein
2014) especially if a direct comparison of subliminal ver-
sus supraliminal effects on the brain using the same
stimulus is conducted.
Limitations
We found 9 studies reporting the neural correlates of
subliminal activation, and 10 studies reporting the neural
correlates of supraliminal activation. Given that our
sample size was small, our data must be regarded as pre-
liminary, providing basic insights into the neural correlates
of conscious processing that need further clarification with
additional brain imaging studies. Additionally, the studies
included were heterogeneous with a bias towards stimula-
tion with images of faces and rectal stimulation, which
likely drove the findings we obtained. Related to the het-
erogeneity of studies, we also included both studies that
provided a direct comparison between subliminal and su-
praliminal stimulation, as well as studies that compared
subliminal and supraliminal stimulation separately to a
neutral condition. We did this so that we could include all
studies that examined the same subliminal and supralimi-
nal stimulus in their publication, even if they did not dir-
ectly compare these levels of stimulation. Also, it must be
noted that although the participants in this meta-analysis
were psychologically healthy, a small number of partici-
pants had existing medical conditions (e.g. GERD, IBS),
which may have influenced brain function. Furthermore,
the ALE approach we adopted does not take into account
the relative strength of activation reported by each study,
but the present version is essentially a 'vote-counting'
method of reported coordinates weighted for the number
of participants per study. There were not enough studies
examining separately neural activation in males andfemales, which, as one of the studies has shown (Gillath &
Canterberry 2011), may be important in terms of gauging
different levels of cognitive control exerted over arousing
stimuli. Furthermore, the stimuli, although commonly ac-
tivating bodily sensations, were quite diverse, incorporat-
ing auditory tones, somatosensory and visual stimulation,
and there were not enough studies using one particular
modality to conduct separate meta-analyses.
Conclusions
While our data is preliminary, it suggests that perception
of non-consciously perceived stimuli activates anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) and insular cortex, to form a
basis for conscious perception. Activation of primary vis-
ual areas by non-consciously perceived stimuli is per-
haps driven by a bias for these studies to use images of
emotional faces, and so more fMRI studies are needed
to compare subliminal and supraliminal presentation of
other types of stimuli in different modalities. After fur-
ther fMRI studies comparing the neural correlates of
subliminal versus supraliminal stimulation, meaningful
conclusions are more likely to be drawn about brain sys-
tems involved in unconscious perception.
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